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Iver B. Neumann 
 
I should like to thank my four interlocutors for their thoughtful responses. I will 
touch only briefly on the comments made by Chris Brown and Jon Mercer, since 
we have few outstanding issues, and concentrate on what, not unexpectedly, 
emerges as the major bone of contention, namely the status of physiology or 
biology relative to a social science like ours. 
 
I agree with Chris Brown that there is perhaps too much self-reflection relative 
to other kinds of analysis within the discipline, but note in my defence that the 
genre of the inaugural is particularly inviting of this kind of stock-taking. We 
only seem to have one disagreement, namely the extent to which the roads not 
travelled in international relations should be studied. I may be more positive on 
this front, both for their inherent interest (what they can tell us about variation in 
relations between human polities) and also for the genealogical reason that 
systems tend to retain the memory of negative choices. These may, therefore, 
prove to be important later on. While I remain skeptical about Searle’s 
distinction between brute and institutional facts – what is so brute about the law 
of gravity in societies that do not acknowledge it?
1
 – I am in agreement with the 
general thrust of Jon Mercer’s argument. Neurosciences are important for us 
because they can tell us more about what is common to psychological systems, 
and so makes it easier to pin down psychological and social variation.
2
  Mercer 
also notes, contra Johnson, that psychology and biology are indeed causally 
linked, but that the psychological realm is ontically separate. I concur. 
 
Dom Johnson and I differ markedly over how to pinpoint the area of validity of 
scientific claims. For me, the social is a separate realm. Johnson sees little or no 
difference between psychology and biology, as an evolutionary psychologist 
would. He also elides these realms and the social. In this, Johnson is true to the 
programme of evolutionary psychology’s forerunner, sociobiology. For 
example, apropos my critique of Thayer, Johnson states that  
 
'To critique a biologist’s work as “functionalist” is amusing. If a trait is 
not functional, then it would never have been favored by natural selection 
(except in special conditions).'  
 
                                            
1 I am still taken with Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy 
)London: Rpoutledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). 
2 At the same time, we need more work that points up the Euro-centrism of extant psychological 
knowledge, see Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine & Ara Norenzayan  ‘The Weirdest People in the 
World?’ Behaviorial and Brain Sciences  33, nos 2-3 (2010), 61–135. 
Quite so. The observation is irrelevant, however, for I did not criticize a 
biologist. I criticised Thayer, presumable a social scientist who writes about 
stuff social, for effortlessly privileging biology. Such effortless privileging is 
unwarranted. Concepts like mutation and natural selection cannot simply be 
lifted from the biological system and applied to the social one. Natural selection 
does not 'cause' social phenomena amongst humans like predation, cooperation 
etc.  Biology cannot ground social inquiry in this direct way, and it remains an 
open question whether any theory of social evolution may be causal. The issue 
here is not whether natural evolution is deterministic. It is not. The determinism 
under discussion here is located elsewhere, namely in trying to ground social 
inquiry directly in biology. Johnson and I agree that psychological and 
physiological factors have knock-on effects on the social, but each effect has to 
be tracked across the boundary between the physiological and the social, for 
context changes phenomena. In order to understand some phenomenon within a 
system, that phenomenon has to be discussed within that system. To take a 
historically charged example, a phenomenon like diffusion cannot simply be 
lifted out of the natural sciences and applied to the social system. How a 
phenomenon, say diffusion or mutation, works within a quite different system is 
relevant, but not sufficient to say something about how it works in the social 
system. It is first and foremost this translation from biology to the social that is 
in need of work, and not the translation from individual to group selection, 




Johnson also argues that 'science is about understanding things as they are'. It is 
striking that an evolutionist should pick such a deterministic line, for 
evolutionism’s focus is change, not stability. Social worlds are evolving, and 
observing them plays a role in their evolution. They cannot, therefore, simply be 
recorded by a view from nowhere. Again, the social falls without the area of 
validity of biological research.  
 
Johnson’s unwillingness to engage with the social as a specific sphere includes 
an unwillingness to engage with work that specifically attempts to think about 
evolutionism in the social sciences. Durkheim himself was an evolutionary 
thinker, and evolutionary Durkheimians are still in clear evidence within the 
social sciences. To give but one example, Wendt’s teleological evolutionism is 
explicitly Durkheimian.
4
 The best elaborated evolutionary approach in the social 
                                            
3 For a general discussion, see Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Samuel, Boyd, Robert Boyd and 
Fehr Ernst, eds., Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in 
Economic Life, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
4 See, especially, Alexander Wendt, ‘The State As Person In International Theory’, Review of 
International Studies, v ol. 30, no. 2 (2004), 289-316. 
sciences is undeniably the Luhmannian one.
5
 These are theories that are explicit 
about their social area of validity. 
 
By the same token, Johnson is much too quick in settling on 'human nature' as 
the fighting ground. Again, the relevance of this notion for IR is not clear. It is, 
therefore, premature to argue that evolutionary theory obviously grounds 
offensive realism, as does Johnson. Other evolutionary approaches conclude 
otherwise. Tang recently presented a book's length evolutionary argument to the 
effect that the world has evolved from being an offensive realist to a defensive 
realist place.
6
 Niklas Luhmann grounds a post-positivist approach to IR. The 
debate is on, and in the interest of a good one all parties, particularly the 
participants themselves, should be reticent about proclaiming walk-over wins. 
 
Where Johnson elides the biological and the social, Lauren Wilcox insists on 
erasing the biological from social inquiry. Her position on the social as such is 
one with which I am very sympathetic indeed. Actually, it is broadly speaking 
the position I held in the 1990s, and I am still in agreement with everything that 
Wilcox has to say about how the social shapes the body, including the need to 
study what kind of bodies current society needs. What I no longer find tenable is 
the lack of attention paid to the physical body. Wilcox's take on the duality 
social body/physical body is not dedifferentiation, but denial of the very 
distinction. She approvingly quotes Butler's view that 'there is no such thing as 
[...] "the body", or "the material"’. Nowhere in Wilcox’s reply, and nowhere in 
her forthcoming book, does she engage with even one scientific work that bears 
on the physiological.  
 
Foucault famously quipped that there was no such thing as life before the 18th 
century, by which he presumably meant that physiological knowledge co-
constitutes the physiological. The emergence of biology changed life. I agree. 
Our understanding of the material world is indeed dependent on knowledge – 
how could it be different? Furthermore, the relationship between the signifier – 
the body as a social fact -- and the signified – the body as a material fact -- is 
indeed indeterminate. In order to be a relationship at all, however, and this is 
where Wilcox and I disagree, the signified, in this case the physical body, needs 
some kind of status. This entire symposium is an attempt to argue why this is so 
scientifically. Wilcox also, and I think laudably, raises political concerns. It is a 
fact that scientific knowledge has indeed co-constituted groups as marginal and 
freakish on a number of occasions. Biologists and other scientists, social 
                                            
5 For a mature statement, see Niklas Luhmann, Theory of  Society, vol. I  (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, [1997] 2012), especially ‘Chapter 3: Evolution’, 251-358. Much to the chagrin of 
biologists, Luhmann assures the specifically social quality of his theorizing by conceiving of the 
system as communicative and placing humans outside of it, as its environment.   
6 Shiping Tang, The Social Evolution of International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013). 
scientists included, have a lot to answer for. However, let us not forget the other 
side of the coin. As I see it, insisting on the importance of the physical body and 
the physiological unity of humankind grounds anti-racist, anti-classist and anti-
sexist politics, for it is a reminder that the organic substrate of human beings is 
indeed that of one species. Contrary to certain political views that remain 
forceful, none of us is baboons, cockroaches or vermin, and none of us has 
horns. Insisting on human physiological universalism is, one may at least hope, 
a bulwark against the spread of such views. To give up on physiology is, 




There is also, I think, a logical reason why it is untenable to erase the 
importance of biology. Social inquiry must be implicitly comparative. Exactly 
because the social is not universal, it cannot ground such inquiry. Social inquiry 
therefore has physiological universalism as its precondition. Humans are apples, 
other mammals are various kinds of citrus fruits, and apples may be compared. 
Furthermore, for social inquiry to be critical, it must discuss its own 
preconditions. The social study of relations between polities has as its 
precondition that these groups are of a kind, and that means of a physiological 
kind. If the physiological unity of humankind is a precondition for social 
inquiry, then it follows that not inquiring into the nature of that unity is an 
uncritical move. 
 
Seeing that the entire social science undertaking rests on the idea that humans 
have a certain sameness, it rests upon us to follow and relate to evolving 
knowledge about that sameness, as it is produced by other disciplines. I thank 
my interlocutors once again for doing their part in nudging this critical issue 




                                            
7 Note that I am talking exclusively about physiological universality here. In social terms, there is 
very little universality. 
